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We consider using a secret key and a noisy quantum channel to generate noiseless public communication and noiseless private communication. The optimal protocol for this setting is the publiclyenhanced private father protocol. This protocol exploits random coding techniques and “piggybacking” of public information along with secret-key-assisted private codes. The publicly-enhanced
private father protocol is a generalization of the secret-key-assisted protocol of Hsieh, Luo, and Brun
and a generelization of a protocol for simultaneous communication of public and private information
suggested by Devetak and Shor.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The qualitative connection between secrecy of information and the ability to maintain quantum correlations
has long been a part of quantum information theory. The
connection comes about from the observation that a maximally entangled ebit state, shared between two parties
named Alice and Bob, has no correlations with the “rest
of the universe”—in this sense, the ebit is monogamous
[1]. We can represent the global state of the ebit and the
“rest of the universe” as
ΦAB ⊗ σ E ,
where Alice and Bob share the ebit ΦAB , and
AB

ΦAB ≡ |Φi hΦ| ,
1
A
B
A
B
AB
|Φi
≡ √ (|0i |0i + |1i |1i ),
2
and σ E is some state of Eve, a third party representing
the “rest of the universe.” Eve’s state σ E is independent of Alice and Bob’s ebit. The relation to a secret
key comes about when Alice and Bob perform local measurements of the ebit in the computational basis. The
resulting state is
Φ
where Φ
Φ

AB

AB

≡

∗ Electronic
† Electronic

AB

⊗ σE ,

is the maximally correlated state:


1
A
B
A
B
|0i h0| ⊗ |0i h0| + |1i h1| ⊗ |1i h1| .
2
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In this setting, the cryptographic setting, we consider
Eve as a potential eavesdropper. She is no longer the
“rest of the universe,” because some party now holds the
AB
purification of the dephased state Φ .
The body of literature on the privacy/quantumcoherence connection has now grown substantially. Some
of the original exploitations of this connection were the
various quantum key distribution protocols [2, 3, 4].
These protocols establish a shared secret key with the
help of a noisy quantum channel or noisy entanglement.
The subsequent proofs [5, 6] for the security of these
protocols rely on the formal mathematical equivalence
between entanglement distillation [7] and key distillation. Schumacher and Westmoreland explored the connection with an information-theoretical study [8]—they
established a simple relation between the capacity of a
quantum channel for transmitting quantum information
and its utility for quantum key distribution. Collins
and Popescu [9] and Gisin et al. [10] initiated the formal study of the connections between entanglement and
secret key. Since then, researchers have determined a
method for mapping an entangled state to a probability
distribution with secret correlations [11] and have continued to extend existing quantum results [12] to analogous
results for privacy [13].
The connection has also proven fruitful for quantum
Shannon theory, where we study the capabilities of a
large number of independent uses of a noisy quantum
channel or a large number of copies of a noisy bipartite
state. The first step in this direction was determining
the capacity of a quantum channel for transmitting a private message or establishing a shared secret key [14, 15].
Devetak further showed how coherently performing each
step of a private protocol leads to a code that achieves
the capacity of a quantum channel for transmitting quantum information [14]. Since these initial insights, we
have seen how the seemingly different tasks of distilling

2
secret key, distilling entanglement, transmitting private
information, and transmitting quantum information all
have connections [16]. Oppenheim et al. have determined a merging protocol for private correlations [17],
based on the quantum state merging protocol [18, 19].
Additionally, the secret-key-assisted private capacity of
a quantum channel [20] is analogous to its entanglementassisted quantum capacity [21, 22].
The connection is only qualitative because the
Horodeckis and Oppenheim have observed that there exist bound entangled states [23]. These bound entangled
states are entangled, yet have no distillable entanglement
(one cannot extract ebits from them), but they indeed
have distillable secret key. The dynamic equivalent of
this state is an entanglement binding channel [24, 25, 26].
This channel has no ability to transmit quantum information. The loss of the privacy-coherence connection here is
not necessarily discomforting. In fact, it is more interesting because it leads to the “superactivation effect” [27]—
the possibility of combining two zero-capacity channels
to form a quantum channel with non-zero quantum capacity. Additionally, the private analog of this scenario
exhibits some unexpected behavior [28].
In this paper, we continue along the privacy-coherence
connection and detail the publicly-enhanced private father protocol. This protocol exploits a secret key and
a large number of independent uses of a noisy quantum
channel to generate noiseless public communication and
noiseless private communication. This protocol is the
“public-private” analog of the classically-enhanced father
protocol [29], and might lead to further insights into the
privacy-coherence connection. The publicly-enhanced
private father protocol combines the coding techniques of
the suggested protocol in Section 4 of Ref. [30] (originally
proven for the classical wiretap channel [31]) with the recent secret-key-assisted private communication protocol
[20].
We structure this work as follows. The next section
establishes the definition of a noiseless public channel, a
noiseless private channel, noiseless common randomness,
and a perfect secret key. We then clarify a small point
with the protocol for private communication [14, 15]—
specifically, we address the apparent ability of that protocol to transmit public information in addition to private information. Section IV describes the publiclyenhanced private father protocol and states our main
theorem (Theorem 1). This theorem gives the capacity
region for the publicly-enhanced private father protocol.
We proceed with the proof of the corresponding converse
theorem in Section V and the proof of the corresponding
direct coding theorem in Section VI. Section VII shows
that the suggested protocol from Ref. [30] is a child of
the publicly-enhanced private father protocol. We then
conclude with some remaining open questions.

II.

DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION

We first introduce the notion of a noiseless public channel, a noiseless private channel, and a noiseless secret
key as resources. Our communication model includes
one sender Alice, a receiver Bob, and an eavesdropper Eve. Alice chooses classical messages k from a set
[K] ≡ {1, . . . , K}. She encodes these messages as quanA
tum states {|ki hk| }k∈[K] . We assume that each party
is in a local, secret facility that does not leak information to the outside world. For example, Eve cannot gain
any information about a state that Alice or Bob prepares
locally. We consider two dynamic resources, public classical communicaton and private classical communication,
and two static resources, common randomness and secret
key.
A noiseless public channel idA→B
from Alice to Bob
pub
implements the following map for k ∈ [K]:
X
A
B
pK 0 |K (k 0 |k) ρE
idA→B
k0 , (1)
pub : |ki hk| → |ki hk| ⊗
k0 ∈[K]

where pK 0 |K (k 0 |k) is some conditional probability distribution and ρE
k0 is a state on Eve’s system. The above
definition of a noiseless public channel captures the idea
that Bob receives the classical information perfectly, but
Eve receives only partial information about Alice’s message. Eve has perfect correlation with Alice’s message
if and only if her conditional distribution pK 0 |K (k 0 |k) is
0
0 E
0
δk0 ,k and her states ρE
k0 = |k i hk | for all k . We make no
distinction between a noiseless public channel where Eve
receives partial information and one where Eve receives
perfect information because we are only concerned with
the rate at which Alice can communicate to Bob—we are
not concerned with the more general scenario of broadcast communication where Eve is an active party in the
communication protocol [32]. We represent the noiseless
public channel symbolically as the following resource:
[c → c]pub .
The resource inequality framework [21] uses the notation [c → c] to represent one noiseless bit of classical communication. We require a symbol different from [c → c]
because that symbol does not distinguish between public
and private communication. For example, the superdense
coding protocol [33] actually produces two private classical bits, but the notation [c → c] does not indicate this
fact.
A noiseless private channel is the following map:
A

B

E
idA→B
priv : |ki hk| → |ki hk| ⊗ σ ,

where σ E is a constant state on Eve’s system, independent of what Bob receives. A private channel appears
as a special case of a public channel where random variable K 0 that represents Eve’s knowledge is independent
of random variable K. The definition in (1) reduces to
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that of a private channel if we set the probability distribution in (1) to pK 0 |K (k 0 ). But we define a private
channel as the case when K 0 and K are independent.
Otherwise, the channel is public. This difference is the
distinguishing feature of a noiseless private channel. We
represent the noiseless private channel symbolically as
the following resource:
[c → c]priv .
The above definitions of a public classical channel and
private classical channel are inspired by definitions in
Refs. [20, 34].
Common randomness is the static analog of a noiseless
public channel [35, 36, 37]. In fact, Alice can actually
use a public channel to implement common randomness.
Alice first prepares a local maximally mixed state π A
where
πA ≡

1 X
A
|ki hk| .
|K|
k∈[K]

She makes an exact copy of the random state locally to
produce the following state:
Φ

AA0

≡

1 X
A
A0
|ki hk| ⊗ |ki hk| .
|K|

(2)

Note that a noiseless public channel alone cannot implement a noiseless private channel, and a noiseless private channel alone cannot implement a noiseless public
channel. This relation is different from the corresponding relation between a noiseless quantum channel and a
noiseless classical channel [39] because a noiseless quantum channel alone can implement a noiseless classical
channel, but a noiseless classical channel alone cannot
implement a noiseless quantum channel.

III.

RELATIVE RESOURCE IN PRIVATE
COMMUNICATION

We would like to clarify one point with the protocol
for private communication [14, 15] before proceeding to
our main theorem. By inspecting the proof of the direct coding theorem in Ref. [14], one might think that
Alice could actually transmit public information at an
additional rate of I (X; E). The following sentence from
Ref. [14] may lead one to arrive at such a conclusion:
“By construction, Bob can perform a measurement that correctly identifies the pair
(k,
m), and hence k, with probability ≥ 1 −
√
4
.”

k∈[K]

She sends the A0 system through the noiseless public
channel. The resulting state represents common randomness shared between Alice and Bob, about which Eve may
have partial information:
X
1 X
A
B
|ki hk| ⊗ |ki hk| ⊗
pK 0 |K (k 0 |k) ρE
k0
|K|
0
k ∈[K]

k∈[K]

A noiseless secret key is the static analog of a noiseless
private channel. Alice again prepares the state π A and
makes a copy of it to an A0 system. She sends the A0
system through a noiseless private channel, generating
the following resource:
1 X
AB
A
B
|ki hk| ⊗ |ki hk| ⊗ σ E = Φ
⊗ σE .
K
k∈[K]

Alice and Bob share perfect common randomness, but
this time, Eve has no knowledge of this common randomness. This resource is a secret key. A perfect secret
key resource has two requirements [38]:
1. The key should have a uniform distribution.
2. Eve possesses no correlations with the secret key.

But this conclusion is incorrect because the random
variable M representing the “public” message m must
have a uniform distribution. This random variable M
serves the purpose of randomizing Eve’s knowledge of the
private message k [40]. The protocol would not operate
as intended if random variable M had a distribution other
than the uniform distribution. The size of the message
set for the random variable M must be at least 2nI(X;E) .
The rate I (X; E) of randomization further confirms the
role of the mutual information as the minimum amount of
noise needed to destroy one’s correlations with a random
variable [41] (see Refs. [42, 43] for further explorations
of this idea). It is thus not surprising that the mutual
information I (X; E) arises in the protocol for private
communication because Alice would like to destroy Eve’s
correlations with her private message k.
The resource inequality [21] for the protocol for private
communication is as follows:
hN i ≥ I (X; E) [c → c : π]pub +

(I (X; B) − I (X; E)) [c → c]priv , (3)

where the mutual information quantities are with respect
to the following classical-quantum state:
X
0
X
A0 →BE
pX (x) |xi hx| ⊗ UN
(σxA ),
x∈X

We denote the resource of a shared secret key as follows:
[cc]priv .

corresponding
to the channel input ensemble
0
{pX (x) , σxA }x∈X . The meaning of the resource inequality is that Alice can transmit nI (X; E) bits of
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public information (with the requirement that Alice’s random variable has a uniform distribution) and
n (I (X; B) − I (X; E)) bits of private information by
using a large number n of independent uses of the noisy
quantum channel N . The resource [c → c : π]pub is not
an absolute resource, but is rather a relative resource
[21, 44, 45], meaning that the protocol only works properly if Alice’s public variable has a uniform distribution,
or equivalently, is equal to the maximally mixed state
π. This public information must be completely random
because Alice uses it to randomize Eve’s knowledge of
the private message.
The resource inequality in (3) leads to a simpler way
of implementing the direct coding theorem of the secretkey-assisted private communication protocol [20]. Suppose that Alice has public information in a random variable M . If she combines this random variable with a
secret key, the resulting random variable has a uniform
distribution because the secret key randomizes the public
variable. This variable can then serve as the input needed
to implement the relative resource of public communication. Alice can transmit an extra nI (X; E) of private information by combining this public communication with
the secret key resource, essentially implementing a onetime pad protocol [46, 47]. We phrase the above argument with the theory of resource inequalities:
hN i + I (X; E) [cc]priv

≥ I (X; E) [c → c : π]pub + I (X; E) [cc]priv +

(I (X; B) − I (X; E)) [c → c]priv

≥ I (X; E) [c → c]priv + (I (X; B) − I (X; E)) [c → c]priv

= I (X; B) [c → c]priv .

This resource inequality is equivalent to that obtained in
Ref. [20].
IV.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TRANSMISSION
WITH A SECRET KEY

Preparation. Alice prepares a public message k in a
register K and private message m in a register M . Each
of these has a uniform distribution:
π

K

K
1 X
K
≡
|ki hk| ,
K
k=1

πM ≡

M
1 X
M
|mi hm| .
M m=1

Alice also shares the maximally correlated secret key
SA SB
with Bob:
state Φ
Φ

SA SB

≡

S
1X
S
S
|si hs| A ⊗ |si hs| B .
S s=1

The overall state after preparation is
πK ⊗ πM ⊗ Φ

SA SB

.

Encryption. Alice exploits an encryption map
f : [M ] × [S] → [M ] .
The encryption map f computes an encrypted variable
f (m, s) that depends on the private message m and the
secret key s. Furthermore, the encryption map f satisfies
the following conditions:
1. For all s1 , s2 ∈ [S] where s1 6= s2 :
f (m, s1 ) 6= f (m, s2 ).
2. For all m1 , m2 ∈ [M ] where m1 6= m2 :
f (m1 , s) 6= f (m2 , s).
The encryption map f corresponds physically to a
CPTP map F M SA →P . The state after the encryption
map is
SA SB

We begin by defining our publicly-enhanced private0 father protocol (PEPFP) for a quantum channel N A →B
from a sender Alice to a receiver
Bob. The channel has an
A0 →BE
extension to an isometry UN
, defined on a bipartite
quantum system BE, where Bob has access to system B
and Eve has access to system E. Alice’s task is to transmit, by some large number n uses of the channel N , one
of K public messages and one of M private messages to
Bob. The goal is for Bob to identify the messages with
high probability and for Eve to receive no information
about the private message. In addition, Alice and Bob
have access to a private string (a secret key), picked uniformly at random from the set [S], before the protocol
begins.
An (n, R, P, RS , ) secret-key-assisted private channel
code consists of six steps: preparation, encryption, channel coding, transmission, channel decoding, and decryption. We detail each of these steps below.

F M SA →P (π K ⊗ π M ⊗ Φ
)=
X
1
P
S
πK ⊗
|f (m, s)i hf (m, s)| ⊗ |si hs| B .
M S m,s
Channel
Encoding. Alice prepares the codeword
A0n
state σk,f
(m,s) based on the public message k and the
encrypted message f (m, s). This encoding corresponds
0n
physically to some CPTP map E KP →A . The state after the encoding map is
X
1
SB
A0n
σk,f
.
(m,s) ⊗ |si hs|
KM S
k,m,s

0n

A
Transmission. Alice sends the state σk,f
(m,s) through
0n

A
the channel UN

n

→B E

n

, generating the state

X
1
SB
Bn En
σk,f
,
(m,s) ⊗ |si hs|
KM S
k,m,s

5

t

where
n

0n

n

B E
A
σk,f
(m,s) ≡ UN

→B n E n

K

0n

A
(σk,f
(m,s) ).

Channel Decoding. Bob receives the above state
from the channel and would like to decode the messages.
He exploits a decoding positive-operator-valued measure
(POVM) that acts on his system B n . The elements of
this POVM are

Alice

M
SA

F

A’

E

U

A’ U
A’

U

tf

E
B
E
B

E

E
B

E

E

Eve

B

SB

B

Bob

n

{ΛB
k,f (m,s) }k∈[K],f (m,s)∈[M ] .

B

Bob places the measurement results k and f (m, s) in the
respective registers K̂ and P̂ . The ideal output state
after Bob’s decoding operation is
X
SB
Bn En
σk,f
⊗|kihk|K̂ ⊗|f (m, s)ihf (m, s) |P̂ ,
(m,s) ⊗|si hs|
k,m,s

where it is understood that the normalization factor is
1/ (KM S).
Decryption. The final step is for Bob to decrypt the
encrypted message f (m, s). He employs a decryption
function g, where
g : [M ] × [S] → [M ] .
The decryption function g satisfies the following property:
∀ s, m

X
1
SB
Bn En
σk,f
⊗ |kihk|K̂ ⊗ |mihm|M̂ .
(m,s) ⊗ |si hs|
KM S
k,m,s

Figure 1 depicts all of the above steps in a general
publicly-enhanced private father code.
The conditions for a good publicly-enhanced secretkey-assisted private code are that Bob be able to decode
the public message k and encrypted message p = f (m, s)
with high probability:
n
Bn
Tr{ΛB
k,p σk,p }

X
s

n

G

M

FIG. 1: The above figure depicts all of the steps in a publiclyenhanced private father code. Alice performs the encryption
map F on her private variable M and her half SA of the
secret key. She then encodes her public variable K and the
encrypted message with the encoding map E. She transmits
the encoded data over a large number of uses of the noisy
channel N . The isometric extension of the noisy quantum
channel N is UN , and we give the full purification of the
channel to Eve. Bob receives the outputs of the channel. He
performs the decoding map D to recover the public variable
K and the encrypted message. He combines the encrypted
message with his half of the secret key and processes these
two variables with the decryption map G. He then recovers
the private variable M . A good publicly-enhanced private
father code has the property that Bob can perfectly recover
the public variable K and the private variable M while Eve
learns nothing about the secret key or the private variable M .

≥ 1 − .

SB

E
σk,f
(m,s) ⊗ |si hs|

n

− σkE ⊗ π SB

This criterion ensures that Eve’s state is independent of
the key and the private message m.
A rate triple (R, P, RS ) is achievable if there exists
an (n, R − δ, P − δ, RS + δ, ) publicly-enhanced private
father code for any , δ > 0 and sufficiently large n. The
capacity region CPEPFP (N ) is a three-dimensional region
in the (R, P, RS ) space with all possible achievable rate
triples (R, P, RS ).
Theorem 1 The capacity region C(N ) of a secret-keyassisted quantum channel N for simultaneously transmitting both public and private classical information is equal
to the following expression:
C(N ) =

∞
[
1 (1) ⊗l
C (N ),
l

(5)

l=1

It is sufficient to consider the above criterion because Bob
can determine the private message m with high probability if he can determine the encrypted message p with high
probability. Also, the following inequality is our security
criterion:
∀k, m

D

g(f (m, s), s) = m.

This decryption function allows Bob to recover Alice’s
private message as m = g(f (m, s), s) based on the encrypted message f (m, s) and the secret key s. Physically,
this operation corresponds to a CPTP map G SB P̂ →M̂ .
The state after this decryption map is

∀k, p

K

1

≤ .
(4)

where the overbar indicates the closure of a set. The
“one-shot” region C (1) (N ) is the set of all R, P, RS ≥ 0,
such that
R ≤ I(X; B)σ ,
P ≤ RS + I (Y ; B|X)σ − I (Y ; E|X)σ ,
P ≤ I(Y ; B|X)σ .

(6)
(7)
(8)

The above entropic quantities are with respect to a “one-

6
shot” quantum state σ XY BE , where
X
σ XY BE ≡
p(x)|xihx|X ⊗ ρYx BE ,

t

M
K

(9)

x

K’

and the states ρYx BE are of the form
X
A0 →BE A0
ρYx BE =
p(y|x)|yihy|Y ⊗ UN
(ρx,y ),

(10)

Alice

0

0

The proof of the above capacity theorem consists of
two parts. The first part that we show is the converse
theorem. The converse theorem shows that the rates in
the above theorem are optimal—any given coding scheme
that has asymptotically good performance cannot perform any better than the above rates. We prove the
converse theorem in the next section. The second part
that we prove is the direct coding theorem. The proof
of the direct coding theorem gives a coding scheme that
achieves the limits given in the above theorem.
V.

M’

Φ

0
M MA

≡

1
M

m=1

|mi hm|

M

0
MA

⊗ |mi hm|

0
M MA

in state Φ
with -accuracy while keeping them secret). Alice shares the maximally correlated secret key
SA SB
state Φ
with Bob:
Φ

SA SB

≡

S
1X
S
S
|si hs| A ⊗ |si hs| B .
S s=1

A’

U

E

E
B

E

E

Eve

B

Bob

B

K’

D

G

M’

FIG. 2: The above figure depicts the coding scenario that we
consider for the converse theorem. It is similar to the protocol
of Figure 1 with the exception that the goal is for Alice and
Bob to generate common randomness and a secret key, rather
than transmitting public and private information respectively.

Alice prepares a state Φ
generation:
0
KKA

≡

0
KKA

for common randomness

K
1 X
K
K0
|ki hk| ⊗ |ki hk| A .
K
k=1

KK 0

MM0

SA SB

A
Alice combines her states Φ A , Φ
.
, and Φ
The most general encoding operation that she can per0
, MA0 , and SA is a conform on her three registers KA
0
0
KA
MA
SA →A0n
ditional quantum encoder E
consisting of
0
0n
MA SA →A
a collection {Ek
}k of CPTP maps [29]. Each

M 0 S →A0n

element Ek A A
of the conditional quantum encoder consists of an encryption with the secret key
and the mapping to channel codewords. Each element
M 0 S →A0n
Ek A A
produces the following state:
ωkM SB A

0n

0
MA
SA →A0n

≡ Ek

(Φ

0
M MA

⊗Φ

SA SB

).

The average density operator over all public messages is
then as follows:
0n
1 X
K
|ki hk| ⊗ ωkM SB A .
K
k

Alice
sends the A0n system through the noisy channel
A0n →B n E n
UN
, producing the following state:

.

(the protocol should be able to transmit the correlations

A’ U

E
B
E
B

B

Φ

M
X

U

SB

PROOF OF THE CONVERSE THEOREM

We outline the proof strategy of the converse before
delving into its details. Consider that a noiseless public
channel can generate common randomness and a noiseless private channel can generate a secret key. Let K(N )
denote the capacity of a quantum channel N for generating common randomness, generating a secret key, while
consuming a secret key at respective rates (R, P, RS ).
The capacity region K(N ) contains the capacity region
C(N ) of Theorem 1 (C(N ) ⊆ K(N )) because of the
aforementioned one-way relation between a noiseless public channel and common randomness and that between a
noiseless private channel and a secret key. It thus suffices
to prove the converse for a secret-key-assisted common
randomness generation and secret key generation protocol. We consider the most general such protocol when
proving the converse and show that the capacity region
in (6-8) bounds the capacity region K(N ). The result
of the converse theorem is then that K(N ) ⊆ C(N ) and
thus that K(N ) = C(N ).
Proof [Converse] Suppose Alice creates the maximally
0
correlated state π M MA locally, where

A’

E

F

SA

y

A →BE
for some density operator ρA
is an isox,y and UN
metric extension of N . It is sufficient to consider |X | ≤
min{|A0 |, |B|}2 + 1 by the method in Ref. [48].

tf

ω KM SB B

n

En

≡

0n
1 X
K
A0n →B n E n
|ki hk| ⊗ UN
(ωkM SB A ).
K

k

Define the systems Y ≡ M SB and X ≡ K so that the
above state is a particular nth extension of the state in
the statement of the public-private secret-key-assisted capacity theorem. The above state is the state at time t
in Figure 2. Bob receives nthe above
state and performs
0
0
a decoding instrument DB SB →KB MB [29] (each element

7
B n S →M 0

B
Dk B
of the instrument consists of a channel decoding and a decryption). The protocol ends at time tf
0
0
KM KB
MB
En
(depicted in Figure 2). Let (ω 0 )
be the state
n n
at time tf after Bob processes ω KM SB B E with the den
0
0
coding instrument DB SB →KB MB .
Suppose that an (n, R − δ, P − δ, RS + δ, ) secret-keyassisted protocol as given above exists. In particular, the
following information-theoretic security conditions follow
from the security criterion in (4):

I (M ; E n |K)ω ≤ ,
I (SB ; E n |K)ω ≤ ,

(11)
(12)

by the application of the Alicki-Fannes inequality [49]
and evaluating the
conditional mutual informations of
n
the ideal state σkE ⊗ π SB in (4). These conditions imply
that Eve learns nothing about the secret correlations in
system M and Eve learns nothing about the secret key
SB (at time t) even if she knows the public variable K.
We prove that the following bounds apply to the elements
of the protocol’s rate triple (R − δ, P − δ, RS + δ),
I(X; B n )ω
,
n
I(Y ; B n |X)ω
P −δ ≤
,
n
n
I(Y ; B |X)ω − I(Y ; E n |X)ω
,
P − δ ≤ RS +
n
I(Y ; E n |X)ω
RS + δ ≥
,
n
R−δ ≤

(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)

for any , δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n.
In the ideal case, the ideal private channel acts on system M to 0produce the maximally correlated and secret
state π M M . So, for our case, the inequality
(ω 0 )

0
M MB
En

−Φ

0
M MB

⊗ σE

n

1

≤

(17)

holds because the protocol
is -good for private commun
nication. The state σ E is some constant state on Eve’s
system.
The lower bound in (16) is the most straightforward
to prove. Consider the following chain of inequalities:
n (RS + δ) + 2
≥ I (M ; E n |K)ω + I (SB ; E n |K)ω + H (SB |K)ω
= H (M |K)ω + H (E n |K) − H (M E n |K)ω +
I (SB ; E n |K)ω + H (SB |K)ω
≥ H (M |SB K)ω + H (E n |SB K) − H (M E n |K)ω +
I (SB ; E n |K)ω + H (SB |K)ω
≥ H (M |SB K)ω + H (E n |SB K) − H (M E n SB |K)ω +
I (SB ; E n |K)ω + H (SB |K)ω
= I (M ; E n |SB K)ω + I (SB ; E n |K)ω
= I (M SB ; E n |K)ω
= I (Y ; E n |X)ω

The first inequality follows by combining the equality
n (RS + δ) = H (SB ) = H (SB |K) and the security criteria in (11-12). The first equality follows from the definition of mutual information. The second inequality follows because H (M )ω = H (M |SB K)ω (M , SB , and K
are independent) and conditioning does not increase entropy H (E n |K) ≥ H (E n |SB K). The third inequality
follows because the addition of a classical system can increase entropy H (M E n |K)ω ≤ H (M E n SB |K)ω . The
second equality follows from the definition of conditional
mutual information. The third equality follows from the
chain rule of mutual information, and the last equality
follows from the definitions Y ≡ M SB and X ≡ K.
We next prove the upper bound in (14) on the private
communication rate:
n(P − δ)
= H (M )
= I (M ; MB0 )ω0 + H (M |MB0 )
≤ I(M ; MB0 K)ω0 + nδ 0
≤ I(M ; B n SB K)ω + nδ 0
= I(M ; B n K|SB )ω + nδ 0
= H (M |SB ) + H(B n K|SB )ω −
H (M B n SB K) + H (SB ) + nδ 0
= H (M SB |K) − H (SB |K) + H(B n K|SB )ω −
H (M B n SB K) + H (SB |K) + nδ 0
= H (M SB |K) + H(B n K|SB )ω −
H (M B n SB K) + nδ 0
≤ H (M SB |K) + H(B n K)ω − H (M B n SB K) +
H (K) − H (K) + nδ 0
= I (M SB ; B n |K)ω + nδ 0
= I (Y ; B n |X)ω + nδ 0
The first equality follows by evaluating the entropy for
M
the state Φ and noting that H (M ) = H (M |K). The
second equality follows by standard entropic relations.
The first inequality follows from (17), Fano’s inequality
[54], and conditioning does not increase entropy. The
second inequality is from quantum data processing. The
third equality follows from the chain rule for mutual information and I (M ; SB ) = 0 because M and SB are
independent. The fourth equality follows by expanding the conditional mutual information. The fifth and
sixth equalities follow from standard entropic relations.
The last inequality follows because conditioning does
not increase entropy H(B n K|SB )ω ≤ H(B n K)ω . The
fifth equality follows by the definition of mutual information, and the last equality follows from the definitions
Y ≡ M SB , X ≡ K, and δ 0 ≡ n1 + P .
The second bound in (15) on the private communication rate follows from adding the bound in (14) to the
bound in (16).
We can use a proof by contradiction to get the bound
on the public rate R. Suppose that we have secret key
available at some rate > I(X; E n )ω /n. Then one could
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combine the public communication at rate R with the
extra secret key in a one-time pad protocol in order to
generate private communication at a rate R + P . The
resulting protocol consumes secret key at a rate greater
than I (Y X; E n ) because
I (Y ; E n |X)ω
I (X; E n )ω
I (Y X; E n )
+
=
.
n
n
n
The state ω is of the form given by the secret-key-assisted
capacity theorem [20]. The total amount of private
communication that a secret-key-assisted protocol can
generate cannot be any larger than I (Y X; B n ) /n [20].
The chain rule also applies to the mutual information
I (Y X; B n ) /n:

A.

I (X; B n )ω
I (Y ; B n |X)ω
I (Y X; B n )
+
=
.
n
n
n
n

If the public rate R were to exceed I (X; B )ω /n, then
this public rate would contradict the optimality of the
secret-key-assisted protocol from Ref. [20]. Thus, the
public rate R must obey the bound in (13).
2

VI.

We first recall the secret-key-assisted private communication capacity theorem (also known as the private father
capacity theorem) [20].
Theorem 2 The secret-key-assisted private channel capacity region CSKP (N ) is given by
∞
[
1 e (1)
C
(N ⊗l ),
l SKP

(19)

l=1

The direct coding theorem is the proof of the following publicly-enhanced private father protocol resource inequality (See Refs. [21, 22] for the theory of resource inequalities):

I (Y ; B|X)σ [c → c]priv + I (X; B)σ [c → c]pub .

Random Private Coding

CSKP (N ) =

PROOF OF THE DIRECT CODING
THEOREM

hN i + I (Y ; E|X)σ [cc]priv ≥

show how to associate a classical string to a random private father code by exploiting the “code pasting” technique from Ref. [30]. The proof proceeds by applying the
HSW theorem [50, 51] to show that Bob can decode the
public information first. Based on the public information, Bob decodes the private information. The details
of the proof involve showing how the random publiclyenhanced private father code has low probability of error
for decoding the public information and the private information. Finally, we employ the standard techniques
of derandomization and expurgation to show that there
exists a particular publicly-enhanced private father code
that achieves the rates given in Theorem 1.

(18)

The resource inequality has an interpretation as the following statement. For any , δ > 0 and sufficiently large
n, there exists a protocol that consumes nI (Y ; E|X)σ
bits of secret key and n independent uses of the noisy
quantum channel N to generate nI (Y ; B|X)σ bits of private communication and nI (X; B)σ bits of public communication with  probability of error. In addition, Eve’s
state is -close to a state that is independent of the private message and the secret key. The entropic quantities
are with respect to the state σ XY BE in (9).
The proof of the direct coding theorem proceeds similarly to the proof of the direct coding theorem for the
classically-enhanced father protocol from Ref. [29]. There
are some subtle differences between the two proofs, and
we highlight only the parts of the proof that are different
from the proof of the classically-enhanced father protocol. The proof begins by showing how to construct a
random private father code, similar to the notion of a
random father code [29] or a random quantum code [14].
We introduce the channel input density operator for a
random private father code and show that it is possible to make it close to a tensor-product state. We then

where the overbar indicates the closure of a set, and
e (1) (N ) is the set of all RS ≥ 0, P ≥ 0 such that
C
SKP
P ≤ I(Y ; B)ρ − I(Y ; E)ρ + RS
P ≤ I(Y ; B)ρ ,

(20)
(21)

where RS is the secret key consumption rate and ρ is a
state of the form
X
A0 →BE A0
ρY BE ≡
p(y)|yihy|Y ⊗ UN
(ρy ),
(22)
y

0

0

A →BE
for some ensemble {p(y), ρA
is an isomety } and UN
ric extension of N .
0n

The channel input density operator ρA (C) for a pri0n
vate father code C ≡ {ρA
m }m∈[M ] is a uniform mixture
0n
of all the private codewords ρA
m in code C:
0n

ρA (C) ≡

M
1 X A0n
ρ .
M m=1 m

We cannot0n say much about the channel input density
operator ρA (C) for a particular private father code C.
But we can say something about the expected channel
input density operator of a random private father code C
(where C itself becomes a random variable).
Definition 1 A random private father code is an ensemble {pC , C} of codes where each code C occurs with probability pC . The expected channel input density operator
0n
ρA is as follows:
n 0n
o
0n
ρA ≡ EC ρA (C) .
(23)
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A random private father code is “ρ-like” if the expected
channel input density operator is close to a tensor power
of some state ρ:
0n

ρA − ρ⊗n

≤ .

1

(24)

We now state a version of the direct coding theorem
that applies to random private father codes. The proof
shows that we can produce a random secret-key-assisted
private code with an expected channel input density operator close to a tensor power state.
Proposition 3 For any , δ 0> 0 and all sufficiently large
n, there exists a random ρA0 -like secret-key-assisted private code for a channel N A →B such that
0n

√
4

0

ρA − (ρA )⊗n

1

≤ 2 + 4 ,

(25)

0n

where ρA is defined in (23). The random private code
has private communication rate I(Y ; B)ρ − δ and secret
key consumption rate I(Y ; E)ρ + δ. The entropic quantities are with respect to the state in (22) and the state
P
0
0
ρA ≡ y p (y) ρA
y .
The proof of Proposition 3 is an extension of the development in Appendix D of Ref. [30] and the development
in Ref. [20].
0
Proof Consider the density operator ρA where
X
0
0
ρA =
p (y) ρA
y .
y∈Y

The nth extension of the above state as a tensor power
state is as follows:
X
0n
0
0n
ρA ≡ (ρA )⊗n =
pn (y n ) ρA
yn ,

0

For any density operator ρA , it is possible to construct a secret-key-assisted private code that achieves the
private communication rate and secret key consumption
rate in Proposition 3.
Let [M ] denote a set of size 2n[I(Y ;B)−cδ] for some
constant c and let Um denote 2n[I(Y ;B)−cδ] random variables that we choose according to the pruned distribution
p0n (y n ). The realizations um of the random variables Um
are sequences in Y n and are the basis for constructing
a secret-key-assisted private code C with the following
codeword ensemble:
n

C = {p0n (um ), ρA
um }m .
We then perform a decoding positive operator-valued
measure (POVM) with elements {Λm }m∈[M ] and decryp√
tion map g, resulting in failure with probability 4+20 
by the arguments in Ref. [20].
Suppose that we choose a particular secret-key-assisted
private code C according to the above prescription. Its
code density operator is
0n

ρA (C) =

Suppose we now consider the secret-key-assisted private code chosen according to the above prescription as a
random code C (where C is now a random variable). Let
0n
ρ0A (C) be the channel input density operator for the
0n
random code before expurgation and ρA (C) its channel
input density operator after expurgation:
0

ρ

0A0n

y n ∈Y n

M
1 X A0n
(C) ≡ 0
ρ ,
M m=1 Um

0n

ρA (C) ≡

where
0n

0

0

0

A
A
A
ρA
y n ≡ ρy1 ⊗ ρy2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρyn .

We define the pruned distribution p0n as follows:
 n n P
n
p (y ) / yn ∈T Y n pn (y n ) : y n ∈ TδY
0n
n
δ
p (x ) ≡
0
:
else,

M
1 X A0n
ρ .
M m=1 um

M
1 X A0n
ρ ,
M m=1 Um

where the primed rates are the rates before expurgation
and the unprimed rates are those after expurgation (they
0n
are slightly different but identical for large n). Let ρ0A
0n
and ρA denote the expectation of the above channel
input density operators:

n

where TδY denotes the δ-typical set of sequences with
0n
length n. Let ρeA denote the following “pruned state”:
X
0n
0n
ρeA ≡
p0n (y n ) ρA
(26)
yn .
y n ∈TδY

0n

ρ

0n

ρA

0n

n 0n
o
≡ EC ρ0A (C) ,
n 0n
o
≡ EC ρA (C) .

n

For any  >
0 and sufficiently large n, the state ρA is
A0n
close to ρe
by the gentle measurement lemma [52] and
because the probability for sequences outside the typical
set is small:
A0n

ρ0A

A0n

− ρe

1

≤ 2.

Choosing our code in the particular way that we did
leads to an interesting consequence. The expectation of
the0ndensity operator corresponding to Alice’s codeword
ρA
Um is equal to the pruned state in (26):
n 0n o X
0n
EC ρA
=
p0n (y n )ρA
Um
yn ,
yn
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0n

because we choose the codewords ρA
y n randomly according to the pruned distribution p0n (y n ). Then the ex0n
pected channel input density operator ρ0A is as follows:
n 0n
o
0n
ρ0A = EC ρ0A (C)
(27)
M0
n 0n o
1 X
= 0
EC ρA
Um
M m=1
X
0n
p0n (y n )ρA
=
yn .

(28)
(29)

yn

Then we know that the following inequality holds for
0n
0n
ρ0A and the tensor power state ρA
0n

ρ0A − ρA

0n

1

≤ 2

(30)

by the typical subspace theorem and the gentle measurement lemma. The expurgation of any secret-key-assisted
private code C has a minimal effect on the resulting channel input density operator [30]:
0n

0n

ρ0A (C) − ρA (C)

1

√
≤ 4 4 .

The above inequality implies that the following one holds
0n
for the expected channel input density operators ρ0A
0n
and ρA
0n

0n

ρ0A − ρA

1

√
≤ 4 4 ,

0n

0n

1

√
≤ 2 + 4 4 

(32)

by applying the triangle inequality to (30) and (31).
Therefore, the random secret-key-assisted private code
is ρ-like.
2
B.

0n

ρA
xn − ρxn

1

≤ .

Proposition 4 Suppose we have an
ensemble as above.
A0 →B
Consider a quantum
channel
N
with its isometA0 →BE
ric extension UN
. Then there exists a random
(ρxn )-like secret-key-assisted private code for the channel
0
N A →B for any , δ > 0, for all sufficiently large
n, and
n
for any classical string xn in the typical set TδX [54]. Its
private communication rate is I(Y ; B|X) − c0 δ, and its
secret key consumption rate is I(Y ; E|X) − c00 δ for some
constants c0 , c00 where the entropic quantities are with respect to the state in (9). The state ρx is the restriction
of the following state
X
0
0
ρYx A =
p(y|x)|yihy|Y ⊗ ρA
x,y
y

to the A0 system.
Proof [Proposition 4] The proof of this theorem proceeds exactly as the proof of Proposition 3 in Ref. [29]
and the proof of Proposition 5 in Ref. [30].
2
C.

Publicly-enhanced secret-key-assisted private
code

(31)

because the trace distance is convex. The following inequality holds
ρA − ρA

Definition 2 A random private code is (ρxn )-like if the
0n
expected channel input density operator ρA
xn is close to
the state ρxn :

Associating a Random Private Code with a
Classical String

Proposition 5 (HSW Coding Theorem [50, 51])
0
Consider an input ensemble {p(x), ρA
x } that gives rise
XB
to a classical-quantum state σ , where
X
0
0
σ XB ≡
p(x)|xihx|X ⊗ N A →B (ρA
x ).
x∈X

Let R = I(X; B)σ − c0 δ for any δ > 0 and for some
constant c0 . Then for all  > 0 and for all sufficiently
large n, there exists a classical encoding map


n
h : 2nR → TδX ,
and a decoding POVM
n

Suppose that we have an ensemble {p(x), ρx }x∈X
of quantum states. The density operator ρx arises
as the expected density operator of another ensemble
{p (y|x) , ρx,y }. Let xn ≡ x1 · · · xn denote a classical
string generated by the density p(x) where each symbol
xi ∈ X . Then there is a density operator σxn corresponding to the string xn where
ρxn ≡

n
O

{ΛB
k }k∈[2nR ] ,
that allows Bob to decode any classical message k ∈ [2nR ]
with high probability:
n

n

Tr{τkB ΛB
k } ≥ 1 − .
n

The density operators τkB are the channel outputs
0n

n

τkB ≡ N A
ρxi .

i=1

Suppose that we label a random private code by the
0n
string xn and let ρA
xn denote its expected channel input
density operator.

→B n

0n

(ρA
h(k) ),

0n

(33)

and the channel input states ρA
xn are a tensor product of
states in the ensemble:
0n

ρA
xn ≡

n
O
i=1

0

ρA
xi .
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We are now in a position to prove the direct coding part
of the publicly-enhanced private father capacity theorem.
The proof is similar to that in Ref. [29, 30].
Proof
[Direct Coding Theorem] Define the public
message set [2nR ], the classical
encoding map h, the
n
channel output states τkB , and the decoding POVM
n
{ΛB
k }k∈2nR as in Proposition 5. We label each public
message k ∈ [2nR ] where R = I(X; B) − c0 δ.
0n
Invoking Proposition 4, there exists a random (ρA
h(k) )like private code Ck with probability density pCk because
0n
each input to the channel ρA
h(k) is a tensor product of

The second inequality follows from Proposition 5 and
(34). Let pe,pub (Ck ) denote the public message error
probability for each public message k of the publiclyenhanced father code C:
pe,pub (Ck ) ≡ 1 − Pr{K 0 = k | K = k}.
Then by the above definition, and (35), it holds that the
expectation of the error probability pe,pub (Ck ) for public
message k with respect to the random private code Ck is
low:

n
τB
k

denote the expected channel output density opLet
erator of the random father code Ck :
n no X
n
n
B
τB
=
pCk τCBk .
k ≡ ECk τCk
Ck

The following inequality holds
0n

0n

A
ρA
h(k) − ρh(k)

1

≤ |X | 
0n

because the random private code Ck is (ρA
h(k) )-like. Then
n
the expected channel output density
operator τ B
k is close
n
to the tensor product state τkB in (33):
n
τB
k

−

n
τkB

1

≤ |X | ,

(34)

because the trace distance
is monotone under the quanA0n →B n
tum operation
N
.
It
then follows that the POVM
n
element ΛB
has a high probability of detecting the exk
n
pected channel output density operator τ kB :
n

n

n

n

n

B
B
B
B
B
Tr{ΛB
k τ k } ≥ Tr{Λk τk } − τ k − τk

≥ 1 −  − |X | .

(36)
(37)

We now show that the private error is small. Input the
0n
SA SB
state π M ⊗ Φ
to the encoder ECMk SA →A , followed by
0n
n
the channel N A →B . The resulting state is an extension
n
n
ΩSCkB B of τCBk :


n
0n
0n
n
SA SB
) .
ΩSCkB B ≡ N A →B ECMk SA →A (π M ⊗ Φ
SB B n

n

Let Ωk
denote the expectation of ΩCSkB B with respect
to the random code Ck :
n
o
n
SB B n
Ωk
≡ ECk ΩSCkB B .
SB B n

n

is an extension of τ B
It follows that Ωk
k . The following inequality follows from (35):
SB B n

Tr{Ωk

n

ΛB
k } ≥ 1 − (1 + |X |).

(38)

The above inequality is then sufficient for us to apply a
modified version of the gentle measurement lemma (See
Appendix C of Ref. [29]) so that the following inequality
holds

 q
q
n
n
SB B n
SB B n
B
B
ECk
Λk ΩCk
Λk − ΩCk
1
p
≤ 8(1 + |X |).
(39)
n

We define a decoding instrument DCB SB →KM for the
random publicly-enhanced private father code C as follows [29, 55]:
 n 
n
DCB SB →KM ρB SB
q

q
X
n
n B n SB
K
Bn
≡
DCBk SB →M
ΛB
ρ
Λ
⊗ |ki hk| ,
k
k
k

n

n

1

(35)

The first inequality follows from the following lemma that
holds for any two quantum states ρ and σ and a positive
operator Π where 0 ≤ Π ≤ I:
Tr {Πρ} ≥ Tr {Πσ} − kρ − σk1 .

n

n

B
ECk {pe,pub (Ck )} = 1 − Tr{ΛB
k τk }
≤ (1 + |X |) .

0

an ensemble {p(x), ρA
x }. The random private code Ck
has encryption-decryption pair (fCk , gCk ) and encodingdecoding pair (ECk , DCk ) for each of its realizations.
We label the combined operations simply as the pair
0n
n
(ECMk SA →A , DCBk SB →M ). It transmits n[I(Y ; B|X) + c0 δ]
private bits, provided Alice and Bob share at least
n[I(Y ; E|X) + c00 δ] secret key bits.
Let C denote the random publicly-enhanced secret-keyassisted private code that is the collection of random private codes {Ck }k∈[2nR ] . We first prove that the expectation of the error probability for public message k is
small. The expectationn is with respect to the random
private code Ck . Let τCBk denote the channel output density operator corresponding to the private code Ck :
o
n
0n
n
0n
n
SA SB
)) .
τCBk ≡ TrSB N A →B (ECMk SA →A (π M ⊗ Φ

where DCBk

SB →M

is the decoder for the private father
q
q
n
n Bn S
n
B
code Ck and each map DCBk SB →M ( ΛB
ρ
ΛB
k
k )
is trace-reducing. The induced quantum operation corresponding to this instrument is as follows:
n n
o
n
DCB SB →M (ρ) = TrK DCB SB →KM (ρ) .
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Monotonicity of the trace distance gives an inequality for
the trace-reducing maps of the quantum decoding instrument:


q
q

n
n
SB B n
 DB n SB →M
ΛB
ΛB
− 
Ck
k ΩCk
k


ECk
n
n


DCBk SB →M ΩSCkB B
1
p
≤ 8(1 + |X |).
(40)
The following inequality also holds




n
n


DCB SB →M ΩSCkB B −
q
q


ECk
n
n
SB B n

 DB n SB →M
ΛB
ΛB
Ck
k ΩCk
k
1

q

q
X
n
n
n
n
DCBk0 SB →M
≤ ECk
ΛkB0 ΩSCkB B
ΛB
k0
 0
k 6=k


q
X q

n
n
SB B
Bn
= ECk
Ω
ΛB
Λ
Ck
k0
k0
 0

1
k 6=k


X
n n
o
SB B n
= ECk
Tr ΛB
Ω
0
k
Ck
 0

k 6=k
n n S Bn o
B
= 1 − Tr ΛB
k Ωk
≤ (1 + |X |).

The above random publicly-enhanced secret-keyassisted private code relies on Alice and Bob having access to a source of common randomness. We now show
that they can eliminate the need for common randomness
and select a good publicly-enhanced secret-key-assisted
private code C that has a low public error pe,pub (Ck ) and
low private error pe,priv (Ck ) for all public messages in a
large subset of [2nR ]. By the bounds in (36) and (43), the
following bound holds for the expectation of the averaged
summed error probabilities:
(
ECk



1



1 X
2nR

≤ 0 + (1 + |X |).

If the above bound holds for the expectation over all
random codes, it follows that there exists a particular
publicly-enhanced private father code C = {Ck }k∈[2nR ]
with the following bound on its averaged summed error
probabilities:

2nR

The first inequality follows by definitions and the triangle
inequality. The first equality follows because the trace
distance is invariant under isometry. The second equality
n
SB B n
follows because the operator ΛB
is positive. The
k ΩCk
third equality follows from some algebra, and the second
inequality follows from (35). The private communication
for all public messages k and codes Ck is good


n
n
DCBk SB →M ΩCSkB B − π M ≤ ,

pe,pub (Ck ) + pe,priv (Ck )

k

1 X

(41)

)

k

pe,pub (Ck ) + pe,priv (Ck ) ≤ 0 + (1 + |X |).

We fix the code C and expurgate the worst half of the private father codes—those private father codes with public
messages k that have the highest value of pe,pub (Ck ) +
pe,priv (Ck ). This derandomization and expurgation yields
a publicly-enhanced private father code that has each
public error pe,pub (Ck ) and each private error pe,priv (Ck )
upper bounded by 2 (0 + (1 + |X |)) for the remaining
public messages k. This expurgation decreases the public rate by a negligible factor of n1 .
2

VII.

CHILD PROTOCOLS

1

because each code Ck in the random private father code
is good for private communication. It then follows that
n


o
n
n
ECk DCBk SB →M ΩSCkB B − π M
≤ .
(42)
1

Application of the triangle inequality to (42), (41), and
(40) gives the following bound on the expected private
error probability:
ECk {pe,priv (Ck )} ≤ 0

(43)

where
0 ≡ (1 + |X |) +

p

√
8(1 + |X |) + 2 ,

Two simple protocols for the public-private setting are
secret key distribution and the one-time pad [46, 47]. Secret key distribution is a protocol where Alice creates
AA0

the state Φ
locally and sends the system A0 through
a noiseless private channel. The protocol creates a secret
key and corresponds to the following resource inequality:
[c → c]priv ≥ [cc]priv .
The one-time pad protocol exploits a secret key and a
noiseless public channel to create a noiseless private channel. It admits the following resource inequality:
[c → c]pub + [cc]priv ≥ [c → c]priv .

and where we define the private error pe,priv (Ck ) of the
code Ck as follows:


n
pe,priv (Ck ) ≡ DCSB →M ΩSCkB B − π M .
1

We now consider some protocols that are child protocols of the publicly-enhanced private father protocol.
Consider the resource inequality in (18). We can combine the protocol with secret key distribution, and we
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recover the protocol suggested in Section 4 of Ref. [30]:
hN i + I (Y ; E|X)σ [cc]priv

≥ I (Y ; B|X)σ [c → c]priv + I (X; B)σ [c → c]pub .

≥ (I (Y ; B|X)σ − I (Y ; E|X)σ ) [c → c]priv +

I (Y ; E|X)σ [c → c]priv + I (X; B)σ [c → c]pub
≥ (I (Y ; B|X)σ − I (Y ; E|X)σ ) [c → c]priv +

I (Y ; E|X)σ [cc]priv + I (X; B)σ [c → c]pub

By cancellation of the secret key term, we are left with
the following resource inequality:
hN i + o [cc]priv ≥ (I (Y ; B|X)σ − I (Y ; E|X)σ ) [c → c]priv
+ I (X; B)σ [c → c]pub ,

where o [cc]priv represents a sublinear amount of secret
key consumption.
We can combine the publicly-enhanced private father
protocol with the one-time pad:
hN i + I (Y ; E|X)σ [cc]priv + I (X; B)σ [cc]priv

≥ I (Y ; B|X)σ [c → c]priv + I (X; B)σ [c → c]pub

+ I (X; B)σ [cc]priv

(44)

≥ I (Y ; B|X)σ [c → c]priv + I (X; B)σ [c → c]priv

= I (XY ; B)σ [c → c]priv

(45)

This protocol is one for secret-key-assisted transmission
of private information. It is not an efficient protocol because the optimal secret-key-assisted protocol [20] implements the following resource inequality:

VIII.

CONCLUSION

We have introduced an optimal protocol, the publiclyenhanced private father protocol, that exploits a secret
key and a large number of independent uses of a noisy
quantum to transmit public and private information.
Several protocols in the literature are now special cases
of this protocol.
A few open questions remain. It remains to determine
the capacity regions of a multiple-access quantum channel [48, 56] and a broadcast channel [32] for transmitting
public and private information while consuming a secret
key. One might also consider the five-dimensional region corresponding to the scenario where Alice and Bob
consume secret key, entanglement, and a noisy quantum channel to produce quantum communication, public
classical communication, and private classical communication. This scenario might give more insight into the
privacy/coherence correspondence. It remains open to
determine the full triple trade-off for the use of a quantum channel in connection with public communication,
private communication, and secret. We have made initial
progress on this problem by exploiting techniques developed in Ref. [39]. Before completing this work, we need
to determine a publicly-assisted private mother protocol, the analog of the classically-assisted mother protocol
in Refs. [21, 39]. This protocol should then allow us to
determine the full triple trade-off for both the dynamic
setting and the static setting.

hN i + I (XY ; E)σ [cc]priv ≥ I (XY ; B)σ [c → c]priv
For a channel with non-zero private capacity so that
I (X; B)σ − I (X; E)σ > 0, the protocol in (45) is not
efficient because it uses more secret key than necessary.
This inefficiency is similar to the inefficiency that we
found for combining the classically-enhanced father protocol with teleportation (See Section VII of Ref. [29]). It
is not surprising that this inefficiency occurs because the
publicly-enhanced private father protocol is the publicprivate analog of the classically-enhanced father protocol
and the one-time pad protocol is the public-private analog of the teleportation protocol [9].
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SAIC-1669 of Science Applications International Corporation.
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